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Abstract. In the last decades linear logic became a useful logical system for various
usage in computer science. Its ability to handle resources and its competence to
describe dynamics of processes predetermine it for describing behavior of programs
and program systems. Linear logic can be apprehended as a multiplicative and
additive extension of usual logic. We show the possibilities how these fragments
can be enriched to describe behavior and to achieve knowledge on an example
of simplified Intrusion Detection System (IDS). We construct Kripke model over
a coalgebra of modal linear logic for pursuing observable behavior of IDS. Using
the same Kripke frame we show how knowledge and belief in the terms of epistemic
linear logic can be achieved.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Linear logic [7] belongs to the newer logical systems with many applications in com-
puter science within last two decades. This logic is a generalization of classical logic.
It allows to describe dynamics of computer processes and to handle with resources.
Girard defined two semantical definitions for this logic: by phase spaces (following
Tarskian semantics) and coherent semantics (following Heyting semantics). The lin-
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ear logic includes new logical connectives that are generalized ones of classical logic.
Traditionally these connectives are divided into two groups:
• multiplicative connectives and
• additive connectives.
Multiplicative connectives include multiplicative conjunction ⊗, multiplicative dis-
junction O with neutral elements (constants) 1,⊥. Additive connectives include
additive conjunction N and additive disjunction ⊕ with neutral elements > and 0.
Following semantical aspects we can consider the multiplicative fragment as
intensional one (Heyting semantical tradition) and additive fragment as extensional
one (Tarski semantical tradition) [6]. Traditionally, the semantics of the extensional
fragment expresses denotation (truth) of a given formula whereas the semantics of
the intensional fragment expresses sense (idea) of a given formula. According to the
previous ideas we can generalize classical logic into two distinct fragments of linear
logic: intensional or extensional, as we need for our purposes.
The application field of linear logic amplifies if we extend it with modal oper-
ators. The aim of our paper is to demonstrate how these two fragments of linear
logic can serve for different goals. The multiplicative (intensional) fragment ex-
tended with modal operators [21, 31] can serve for describing observable behavior
of programs. The additive (extensional) fragment extended with epistemic opera-
tors [9, 20, 16] can be useful for acquiring knowledge and belief of some events in
program execution.
In our paper we illustrate how these two fragments can be used for different
purposes in computer science on an example of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [1,
38, 41].
There are several works using logical methods in intrusion detection based on
linear temporal logic. In [28] linear temporal logic Eagle extended with primitive
modalities next, previous and concatenation is used for specifying intrusion patterns
as temporal formulae. This approach is deployed in [19] incorporating knowledge
into various kinds of agents in the new architecture of IDS. In [40] an intrusion
detection algorithm is presented that is based on model checking. The authors
use interval temporal logic enabling to describe concurrent attacks. The research
in the area of modelling IDS based on various extensions of linear temporal logic
has produced several prototype tools among which Orchids [29] based on model
checking is most elaborated. We see the main advantage of linear logic used in our
approach in its resource-oriented features. Linear logic has integrated time-space
calculus at disposal, where every proof of formulae considered as space-resource can
be transferred into a polarized proof tree depicting particular, possibly branched
time lines [10]. We are convinced that resource-oriented character of linear logic
designates it for usage in computing science.
Within investigating program systems we are interested not only in their con-
struction, but also in their observable behavior. Observable behavior can be mod-
elled by coalgebras in categorical terms [12, 35, 34] using coalgebraic modal logic [18,
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30]. Relationship between coalgebras and modal logic was formulated in [3]. In Sec-
tion 2 we define the intensional fragment of coalgebraic modal linear logic for IDS
and we construct its model. We follow our results published in [24], where IDS is
modelled as a coalgebra over appropriate polynomial endofunctor. The basic idea is
that a coalgebra can be considered as a general form of Kripke semantics for modal
logic.
Within behavioral observation some events can repeat and they can provide
some interesting knowledge about program systems. Following the results in [39] we
assume that objective knowledge implies rational belief. Knowledge and belief are
fundamental notions of epistemic logic [2, 4, 5, 22]. In our approach we investigate
the possibilities of obtaining objective knowledge and rational belief for simplified
model of IDS following our results in [26]. Incoming packets form infinite streams
and some of them can contain some intrusion attempts. These attempts can be
recognized through characteristic symptoms. A determined combination of these
symptoms gives us a knowledge about some kind of incoming intrusion. Moreover,
if it comes from the same IP address and repeatedly, then we are sure that it is a real
intrusion attempt and we can make our decision about competent reaction. We use
extensional fragment of epistemic linear logic for describing objective knowledge and
rational belief as a suitable logical system for reasoning about intrusion attempts.
Repeating of the intrusion attempts can be described by the exponential operator !.
2 COALGEBRAIC MODAL LINEAR LOGIC FOR IDS
Typically, coalgebraic approach uses a modal logic with two modal operators ( for
necessity and ♦ for possibility) [18, 27]. In our approach we work with modal linear
logic fragment because of the causality of its linear implication. We define the syntax
of our intensional modal linear fragment by extended BNF form
ϕ ::= ai|ϕ1( ϕ2|ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2|ϕ1Oϕ2|1|⊥|ϕ|♦ϕ|OΦ (1)
where
• ai are atomic propositions,
• ϕ1 ( ϕ2 means linear implication; it ensures that the action ϕ2 follows after
the action ϕ1,
• ϕ1⊗ϕ2 is intensional conjunction expressing that the actions ϕ1 and ϕ2 are both
performed,
• ϕ1Oϕ2 is intensional disjunction expressing if ϕ1 is not performed then ϕ2 is
performed and vice versa,
• 1 is the neutral element of the intensional conjunction,
• ⊥ is the neutral element of the intensional disjunction,
• ϕ means application of the necessity operator to the formula ϕ,
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• ♦ϕ means application of the possibility operator to the formula ϕ,
• O is a new modal operator introduced in [8] named (coalgebraic) cover modality.
This operator O takes a finite sequence Φ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn} of formulae and
returns a single formula OΦ.
For our fragment of modal linear logic we define OΦ as
OΦ ≡ (OΦ)⊗⊗♦Φ (2)
where O denotes
OΦ ≡ ϕ1Oϕ2O . . . (3)
and
♦Φ = {♦ϕ|ϕ ∈ Φ}. (4)
Then following [37] the symbol⊗ denotes (possibly infinite) conjunction of formulae
and ⊗
♦Φ ≡ ♦ϕ1 ⊗♦ϕ2 ⊗ . . . (5)
Modalities of necessity  and possibility ♦ can be defined in the terms of operator
O and they satisfy the following equivalences
♦Φ ≡ O{Φ, 1}
Φ ≡ OεOOΦ (6)
where ε is empty sequence of formulae.
We illustrate coalgebraic modal linear logic on the example of IDS. We consider
only three types of possible intrusions, A, B and C. If a packet does not contain
any intrusion attempt we denote it by X. Because we need some identification of
a sender, let O be its IP address. We construct the category Packet of incoming
packets as follows:
• the objects are significant packet fragments for identification of intrusion at-
tempts,
p = (A+B + C +X)×O (7)
where + and × denote coproduct and product of objects, respectively,
• the morphisms are mappings next between objects
next : pi → pi+1 (8)
for i ∈ N.
It is clear that the category Packet has special sets as objects.
We construct the coalgebra over the category Packet. A coalgebra [15] is con-
sidered as a structure for keeping track of states by observable properties. Formally,
a coalgebra is a pair
(U, c) (9)
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where U is a state space, c : U → T (U) is a coalgebraic specification and T is
a polynomial endofunctor. Let C be a category and X, Y be its arbitrary objects.
A polynomial endofunctor T : C → C on the the category C is a functor constructed
by using finite amount of following functorial operations: products in the formX×Y ,
coproducts in the form X + Y and exponents in the form XY [11, 17].
The state space for IDS is a stream of packets denoted by ρp. Now we define
a polynomial endofunctor T : Packet→ Packet on this category as follows:
T (p) = X × p and T (next(p)) = X × next(p). (10)
Then coalgebraic specification for the polynomial endofunctor T is a tuple
〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp (11)
where hd and tl are obvious operations returning a head or a tail of a given stream.
Following our results in [24] we modelled IDS system as a coalgebra (T -model)
(ρp, 〈hd, tl〉). (12)
Contemporary experiences in system behavior have shown the importance of
selection of an appropriate modal logical language as a specification language for
various transition systems. Formulae of this language are used to logical reasoning
over states of dynamic system that are captured by the coalgebra of correspond-
ing polynomial (powerset) endofunctor. We formulated coalgebraic logic based on
multimodal language suitable for the behavioral description of infinite, non trivial
heterogenous data structures, i.e. packets at the coalgebra as intrusion detection
system in [23, 25].
The consecutive application of coalgebraic specification produces an infinite se-






(p1, (p2, (p3, (. . . , (. . . ,1) . . .))))
(13)
where the first row (1) denotes the empty sequence, the initial state of the system.
The second row arises after the first application of coalgebraic specification and it
corresponds with the coalgebraic linear formula (p1 ⊗ 1). It describes the system
where the first packet has arrived. The following rows describe iterative application
of coalgebraic specification up to possible infinite sequence. The last row corresponds
with the following coalgebraic linear formula
⊗ {(p1, (p2, (p3, (. . . , (. . . ,1) . . .))))} . (14)
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In the following text let Prop be a set of propositions.
As a model of our intensional fragment of modal linear logic we define appro-
priate Kripke model of possible worlds. Kripke model consists of a Kripke frame
(W,≤, w0) (15)
together with a satisfaction relation |=i forming a tuple
(W,≤, |=i, w0) (16)
where
• W is a set of possible worlds,
• ≤ is an accessibility relation ≤⊆ W ×W ,
• |=i is a intensional satisfaction relation
|=i: W × Prop→ {1,⊥} (17)
where 1 means satisfaction and ⊥ means non satisfaction,
• w0 is a designated world.
We read the notation w1 ≤ w2 as follows: A possible world w2 is reachable (acces-
sible) from w1. According to the philosophy of possible world semantics: “what is
reachable is possible” [42].
A coalgebra can be seen as a general form of Kripke semantics for modal
logic [39]. An interpretation of a formula in a coalgebra is given by predicate lift-
ing [32], i.e. a natural transformation
λ : P− ⇒ P− ◦ T (18)
where P− is a contravariant powerset functor P− : Set → Set between sets (Fig-
ure 1).




Figure 1. Predicate lifting
λ(ρp) is a class of morphisms defined by
λ(ρp) : P−(ρp)→ (P− ◦ T )(ρp). (19)
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This predicate lifting produces P-model over T -model as follows:
P-model ((λ(ρp), 〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp)
⇑ λ
T -model ((ρp), 〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp)
i.e.
• every packet p ∈ ρp lifts to a (designated) world w ∈ W ,
wi wi wi wi . . .
⇑ λ ⇑ λ ⇑ λ ⇑ λ . . .
p1 p2 p3 p4 . . .
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n
• every morphism next lifts to the accessibility relation ≤.
Now we have Kripke frame (W,≤).
We define the interpretation of formulae in our P-model
(λ(ρp), 〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp) (20)
as follows:
• for every formula ϕ we define its semantics as a set JϕK ⊂ ρp simply by induction
on the structure of ϕ,
• for modal operator  we define the satisfaction as a composition
JϕK = P−(〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp) ◦ λ(JϕK). (21)
The operator of possibility ♦ is dual to the operator of necessity .
It is clear that in IDS the set W of possible worlds corresponds to a stream of
packets ρp.
• Every world w ∈ W corresponds to a packet p ∈ ρp,
• the reachability relation
≤⊆ W ×W (22)
gives a P-coalgebra
(W, 〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp〉) (23)
where
(〈hd, tl〉 : ρp → Tρp)≤(w) = {w′ ∈ W |(w,w′) ∈≤} . (24)
68 D. Mihályi, V. Novitzká
3 EPISTEMIC LINEAR LOGIC FOR IDS
Epistemic logic is characterised as a logic of objective knowledge and rational be-
lief. Our aim is to show how we can achieve knowledge and belief about intrusion
attempts using Kripke model. We use extensional fragment of linear logic and we
define the syntax of our epistemic linear logic as follows:
ϕ ::= ai|ϕ1Nϕ2|ϕ1 ⊕ ϕ2|0|>|!ϕ|ϕ⊥|Kxϕ|Bxϕ (25)
where
• ai are atomic propositions (i.e. pieces of knowledge),
• ϕ1Nϕ2 is the extensional conjunction of two formulas ϕ1,ϕ2,
• ϕ1 ⊕ ϕ2 is the extensional disjunction of two formulas ϕ1,ϕ2,
• > is the neutral element of the extensional conjunction,
• 0 is the neutral element of the extensional disjunction,
• !ϕ is empiric modal linear operator expressing pleonasm property of formula,
• ϕ⊥ is linear negation,
• Kxϕ denotes that a rational agent c knows that ϕ,
• Bxϕ denotes that a rational agent c believes that ϕ.
Assume an infinite stream of packets ρp as the following sequence
(pi, pi+1, . . . , pn, . . . , pn+299, pn+300, pn+301, . . .). (26)
This sequence can be elaborated stepwise:
7→ (A×O,X ×O, . . . , A×O, . . . , A×O,B ×O,C ×O, . . .) 7→
7→ (X ×O, . . . , A×O, . . . , A×O,B ×O,C ×O, . . .) 7→∗
7→∗ (A×O, . . . , A×O,B ×O,C ×O, . . .) 7→300
7→300 (B ×O,C ×O, . . .) 7→
7→ (C ×O, . . .) 7→
7→ . . .
(27)
In this stream
• pj, j ∈ N are treated packet fragments,
• A is an intrusion attempt COMMUNITY SIP,
• B is an intrusion attempt SNMP AgentX/tcp, request
• C is an intrusion attempt SNMP request tcp.
Using Kripke frame from (20) we show how knowledge and belief about some
intrusion attempt can be achieved from the stream of packets. The extensional
satisfaction relation for our epistemic linear logic is defined as
|=e: W × Prop→ {>,0} (28)
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where > means satisfaction and 0 means non satisfaction.
Before we define how to acquire a knowledge and belief from the symptoms
in incomming stream of packets, we have to define Kripke semantics for epistemic
operators K of knowledge and B of belief. We come out from approach published
in [13] and [14].
In the following, let x be an agent.
A formula Kxϕ is satisfied in a world w if and only if ϕ is satisfied in all worlds
w′ accessible from w, w ≤ w′
w |=e Kxϕ iff for every w′, w ≤ w′, w′ |=e ϕ. (29)
In the definition of the semantics of the operator B we use the basic idea of epistemic
logic: a “knowledge implies a belief”, i.e. a formula Bxϕ is satisfied in a world w if
Kxϕ is satisfied in this world. If we formalize this idea in the form of implication,
it does not embrace the case when a formula Bxϕ is not satisfied in a world w.
Therefore we use equivalence in the form
w |=e Kxϕ iff w |=e Bxϕ. (30)
However, this definition states that both epistemic operators K and B have the
same semantics. We make this definition more meaningful if we require repeated
knowledge of ϕ using exponential operator “!”, i.e. !Kxϕ
w |=e!Kxϕ iff w |=e Bxϕ. (31)
We explore the following cases. It is not enough to obtain a knowledge Kxϕ to
acquire a belief about an intrusion attempt. Our definition requires repeated know-
ledge. By contraries, if Bxϕ is satisfied in a world w, then !Kxϕ has to be satisfied
in this world. In other words, a belief in an intrusion attempt is equivalent with
repeatedly obtained knowledge about this attempt. If Bxϕ is not satisfied in a world
w then !Kxϕ is not satisfied in this world. In other words, if an agent x is not
convinced of an intrusion attempt then either it has obtained a knowledge only once
or has not obtained any knowledge about intrusion attempt.
Type A Type B Type C











Table 1. Particular types of network intrusions
Let AP = {a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3, . . .} be a set of atomic propositions.
Every atomic proposition denotes one symptom of possible intrusion attempt.
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Figure 2. Achieving knowledge
In our example of IDS we consider only one (rational) agent 007. This agent
can be a part of communication interface between human and computer system.
According to Table 1 we achieve the knowledge about intrusion attempt of Type
A from the tuple (a1, a2, a3, a4) if
• a1: Protocol is equal to ip,
• a2: Port is equal to 5060,
• a3: count is equal to 300,
• a4: seconds is equal to 60.
If a symptom ai is present then we assign the value > to it. Otherwise we assign
the value 0 to ai. All possible situations are shown in Table 2. We see that we will
work with sixteen possible worlds.
According to the definition of operator K, Figure 2 shows how the agent 007
achieves the particular piece of knowledge about a1. Similarly, we can apply this
technique on the other symptoms a2, a3, a4.
The intrusion attempt of Type A occurs only if all symptoms ai have occurred,
i.e. there exists a world wa where
wa |=e K007a1 wa |=e K007a2 wa |=e K007a3 wa |=e K007a4. (32)
The existence of a world wa results from our Kripke frame. Therefore the agent
007 has objective knowledge about intrusion attempt of Type A if it has objective
knowledge about all symptoms ai, i = 1, . . . , 4.
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Type A a1 a2 a3 a4
w16 0 0 0 0
w15 0 0 0 >
w14 0 0 > 0
w13 0 0 > >
w12 0 > 0 0
w11 0 > 0 >
w10 0 > > 0
w9 0 > > >
w8 > 0 0 0
w7 > 0 0 >
w6 > 0 > 0
w5 > 0 > >
w4 > > 0 0
w3 > > 0 >
w2 > > > 0
w1 > > > >
Table 2. Intrusion Type A – COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP
The following formula K007χ denotes objective knowledge about intrusion at-
tempt of Type A
K007χ ≡ K007a1NK007a2NK007a3NK007a4 (33)
and it is satisfied in w1, i.e. wa = w1.
Similarly, for the next intrusion attempt of Type B we consider the following
pieces of knowledge about given intrusion attempt from a tuple (b1, b2, b3) if
• b1: Protocol is equal to tcp,
• b2: Port is equal to 705,
• b3: classtype is equal to attempt-recon.
If a symptom bi is present then we assign the value > to it. Otherwise we assign
the value 0 to bi. According to Table 3 we will work with eight possible worlds.
Using the same technique as in the previous case, we can affirm that the agent
007 has the particular piece of knowledge about bi, i = 1, . . . , 3.
The intrusion attempt of Type B occurs only if all symptoms bi have occurred,
i.e. there exists a world wb where
wb |=e K007b1 wb |=e K007b2 wb |=e K007b3. (34)
Therefore the agent 007 has objective knowledge about intrusion attempt of Type B
if it has objective knowledge about all symptoms bi, i = 1, . . . , 3.
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Type B b1 b2 b3
w24 0 0 0
w23 0 0 >
w22 0 > 0
w21 0 > >
w20 > 0 0
w19 > 0 >
w18 > > 0
w17 > > >
Table 3. Intrusion Type B – SNMP AgentX/tcp request
The following formula K007ϕ denotes objective knowledge about intrusion at-
tempt of Type B
K007ϕ ≡ K007b1NK007b2NK007b3 (35)
and it is satisfied in w17, i.e. wb = w17.
For the intrusion attempt of Type C we consider the following pieces of know-
ledge (c1, c2, c3) if
• c1 : Protocol is equal to tcp,
• c2 : Port is equal to 161,
• c3 : flow is equal to stateless.
If a symptom ci is present then we assign the value > to it. Otherwise we assign the
value 0 to ci. According to Table 4 we will also work with eight possible worlds.
Type C c1 c2 c3
w32 0 0 0
w31 0 0 >
w30 0 > 0
w29 0 > >
w28 > 0 0
w27 > 0 >
w26 > > 0
w25 > > >
Table 4. Intrusion Type C – SNMP request tcp
Again, using the same technique as in the previous case, we can affirm that the
agent 007 has the particular piece of knowledge about ci, i = 1, . . . , 3.
The intrusion attempt of Type C occurs only if all symptoms ci have occurred,
i.e. there exists a world wc such that
wc |=e K007c1 wc |=e K007c2 wc |=e K007c3. (36)
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Therefore the agent 007 has objective knowledge about intrusion attempt of Type C
if it has objective knowledge about all symptoms ci, i = 1, . . . , 3.
The following formula K007ψ denotes objective knowledge about intrusion at-
tempt of Type C
K007ψ ≡ K007c1NK007c2NK007c3 (37)
and it is satisfied in w25, i.e. wc = w25.
Figure 3. Epistème
We denote by K007τ the knowledge about sender identification.
In Figure 3 we illustrate how we achieve knowledge and belief about intrusion
attempts from a fragment of packet stream in (27).
The formula
(K007χN. . .NK007χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
300
)NK007τ (38)
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describes that an attempt of Type A from the same sender occurred 300 times. The
formula
(K007ϕNK007ψ)NK007τ (39)
describes the attempts of Type B and Type C from the same sender. Extensional
consequence in terms of epistemic linear logic can be written through negation and
extensional disjunction. Then the formula
K007ξ ≡ ((K007χN. . .NK007χ)NK007τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
300
)⊥ ⊕ ((K007ϕNK007ψ)NK007τ) (40)
describes the situation, when after repeated attempt of Type A the attempts of Type
B and Type C from the same sender follow immediately. This situation is known
as vertical portscan [36]. There exists a world w0, our designated world, such that
w0 |=e K007ξ. If this situation repeats, using our semantics of operator B we state
that the agent 007 has achieved rational belief about vertical portscan occurrence
in the world w0
w0 |=e!K007ξ iff w0 |=e B007ξ (41)
and we can make some protecting actions.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present our ideas about achieving knowledge and belief from the
observable behavior of program systems. We illustrate our approach on the sim-
plified IDS and we show how the pieces of knowledge can be achieved from some
symptoms, how its combination gives us the knowledge about some intrusion detec-
tion and how repeating of some knowledge leads to belief about a concrete intrusion
attempt. Our approach is based on coalgebraic modelling of system behavior. In-
stead of obvious correspondence with modal logic we construct Kripke model of
extensional fragment of epistemic linear logic suitable for our purposes and we show
how we can achieve objective knowledge and rational belief from this model from
pieces of knowledge.
Our approach uses only IP protocol version ipv4 and only three possible intrusion
attempts. Our idea can be generalized for any type of intrusion attempt and we
would like to investigate achieving of knowledge and belief for IP protocol version
ipv6, too. In further research we would like to follow our results and extend our
approach for distributed intrusion attempts considering groups of agents as rational
carriers of knowledge.
Our formal approach can also be implemented for real intrusion attempts with
very sophisticated nature and can help us to make correct decisions about competent
reactions.
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[18] Kurz, A.: Coalgebras and Modal Logic. CWI, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2001.
[19] Das, P.—Niyogi, R.: A Temporal Logic Based Approach to Multiagent In-
trusion Detection and Prevention. International Journal of Communication Net-
work & Security, Vol. 1, 2011, No. 1, pp. 53–61.
[20] Marion, M.—Sadrzadeh, M.: Reasoning about Knowledge in Linear Logic:
Modalities and Complexity, Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer,
2004.
[21] Martini, S.—Masini, A.: A Modal View of Linear Logic. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, Vol. 59, 1994, No. 3, pp. 888–899.
[22] Martini, J.-J. Ch.: Epistemic Logic. Artifical Intelligence Preprint Series, No. 10,
1999.
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Valerie Novitzka works as a Full Professor of Informatics at
the Department of Computers and Informatics of the Faculty of
Electrical Engineering and Informatics, Technical University in
Koice, Slovakia. She defended her Ph. D. thesis “Formal Seman-
tics of Annotated ADA” in Budapest, Hungary in 1989. Her
fields of research include non-classical logical systems and their
applications in computing science. She also works with type
theory, behavioural modeling of large program systems based on
categories.
